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Abstract
This paper provides a thorough analysis of oligopolistic markets with positive demand-side
network externalities and perfect compatibility. The minimal structure imposed on the model
primitives is such that industry output increases in a rms rivalstotal output as well as in the
expected network size. This leads to a generalized equilibrium existence treatment that includes
guarantees for a nontrivial equilibrium, and some insight into possible multiplicity of equilibria.
We formalize the concept of industry viability and show that it is always enhanced by having
more rms in the market and/or by technological improvements. We also characterize the e¤ects
of market structure on industry performance, with an emphasis on departures from standard
markets. As per-rm prots need not be monotonic in the number of competitors, we revisit
the concept of free entry equilibrium for network industries. The approach relies on lattice-
theoretic methods, which allow for a unied treatment of various general results in the literature
on network goods. Several illustrative examples with closed-form solutions are also provided.
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1 Introduction
It has often been observed that the nature of competition is qualitatively di¤erent in network
industries. The presence of interdependencies in consumerspurchasing decisions induces demand-
side economies of scale that highly a¤ect market behavior and performance. When such e¤ects
prevail, be they of the snob or bandwagon type, purchase decisions are strongly inuenced by buyers
expectations, leading to behavior not encompassed by traditional demand theory (Veblen, 1899, and
Leibenstein, 1950). From an industrial organization perspective, these distinctive features raise new
questions and impose some methodological challenges. In their pioneering work on markets with
network e¤ects, Katz and Shapiro (1985) developed the concept of fullled expectations Cournot
equilibrium, which was widely adopted. The resulting literature on the topic has established a
number of results that distinguish network markets from the ordinary ones.1
The purpose of the present paper is to provide a thorough theoretical investigation of markets
with homogeneous goods and network externalities, which unies and extends the existing studies
and tackles a number of new issues of interest that were either not previously addressed or only
partially studied. We consider oligopolistic competition amongst rms in a market characterized by
positive (direct) network e¤ects when the products of the rms are perfectly compatible with each
other, so that the relevant network is industry-wide. While the current literature is more concerned
with the case of rm-specic networks, three arguments justify our choice. First, several important
industries t the perfect compatibility framework, in particular those in the telecommunications
sector, such as fax machines and phones, but also many classical industries such as fashion, au-
tomobiles, entertainment, etc.2 Second, there are still several outstanding issues, which, although
addressed in the growing literature on network externalities, have not been fully articulated from
a modeling perspective, and thus remain less than fully understood from a theoretical standpoint.
Third, a good understanding of the single network case can shed quite some light on the incentives
for compatibility faced by rms in the case of rm-specic networks.
In its unifying scope, with an emphasis on minimal and economically meaningful assumptions
on the market primitives, the paper provides a general existence result for non-trivial equilibria (i.e.
1See Economides and Himmelberg (1995), Economides (1996), Shy (2001) and Kwon (2007), among others.
2For some of these industries, each customer may have in mind his own social network only, as opposed to the overall
industry network, when making a purchase decision, but we follow much of the literature in industrial organization
in ignoring this distinction.
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those with positive production), a uniqueness argument, and an extensive inquiry into the e¤ects
of market structure (or exogenous entry) on market performance. In terms of novel questions, the
paper o¤ers a general treatment of the critical issue of industry start-up, including the role of the
number of rms in the market and technological improvements. It also provides some insight into the
notion that the presence of expectations can substantially broaden the scope of possible outcomes
relative to standard Cournot oligopoly, and a new look at the notion of free entry equilibrium into
network industries. Throughout, the paper takes a comparative perspective in that new ndings are
contrasted with their standard Cournot counterparts, in an attempt to shed light on the distinctive
features of network industries.
The underlying approach is to impart minimal monotonicity structure to the oligopoly model
at hand, which achieves the twin goals of ensuring the existence of a fullled expectations Cournot
equilibrium while at the same time allowing clear-cut predictions on the comparative statics of
market performance with respect to the number of rms. The critical structure is imposed on the
model in the form of two economically meaningful complementarity conditions on the primitives
that guarantee the key properties that, along a given rms best response, industry output increases
in rivalstotal output as well as in the expected network size. The overall analysis relies on lattice-
theoretic methods.3 A key benet of the approach is to allow for more transparent economic
intuition behind the cause-e¤ect relationships we analyze.
We next provide a more detailed overview of our ndings, coupled with a literature review. The
problem of existence of fullled expectations Cournot equilibrium proceeds in two distinct steps.
To establish abstract existence via Tarskis xed point theorem, we adopt the arguments of Amir
and Lambson (2000) and Kwon (2007) who directly exploit the monotonicity structure discussed
above. However, as expectations about the size of the network is a key determinant of consumers
willingness to pay in these industries, the trivial, no production, equilibrium is often part of the
equilibrium set. When this is the case, our previous proof of existence is not of much interest; it
uses powerful methods to establish existence, but the underlying equilibrium may a priori be the
trivial one, the presence of which can be characterized in a more direct fashion. As a consequence
we complete the analysis by o¤ering a second set of (stronger) conditions that ensure the existence
of (at least) one non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive sales.
Although the model is static in nature, we construct an explicit dynamics, mapping consumers
3See Topkis (1978), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990) and Milgrom and Shannon (1994).
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expectation of the network size to the corresponding Cournot industry output to analyze the viability
of the industry. This tatonnement-type dynamics is quite natural and has tacitly been the basis of
many discussions of the viability issue in the literature. Studies of telecommunications markets, such
as Rohlfs (1974) and Economides and Himmelberg (1995), often suggest that network industries
typically have three equilibria. Under this natural dynamics, the two extreme equilibria are stable
in expectations and the middle equilibrium (usually called critical mass) is unstable. The argument
behind this structure is quite simple for pure network goods: If consumers expect that few buyers
will acquire the good, then the good will be of little value to consumers and few of them will
end up buying it. These low sales in turn further depress consumers expectations through the
above dynamics, and the market unravels towards the trivial (or no-trade) equilibrium. However,
if expectations are higher to start with, other, non-trivial, equilibria will also be possible. This
argument is often used to explain the start-up problem in network industries, or the di¢ culties
faced by the incumbent rms in attempting to generate enough expectations to achieve critical
mass.
An important aim of the present paper is to shed light on the role of market structure as a
determinant of the viability of a network industry, a novel issue that, somewhat surprisingly, has
not yet been addressed in the literature. We nd that the presence of more rms in the market always
enhances industry viability. The same conclusion holds for exogenous technological improvements,
a plausible explanation e.g. of the history of the fax machine industry.
Regarding market performance, the extremal equilibria (i.e. maximal and minimal) lead to an
industry output that increases in the number of rms, n, as in standard Cournot competition. On
the other hand, as this also implies an increase in the equilibrium network size or expectations,
the output result does not imply that market price decreases in n. Thus, the so-called property
of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar assumptions holds in standard Cournot competition,
does not hold here.4 In addition, when n increases per-rm equilibrium output increases if the
demand is not too log-concave in output and decreases otherwise.
The most drastic departure from standard oligopoly lies in the e¤ects of entry on per-rm prots.
Whenever per-rm outputs and the market price increase (decrease) with n; per-rm prots increase
4A Cournot market is said to be quasi-competitive if the equilibrium market price decreases with the number of
rms in the industry.
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(decrease) in n as well.5 The conclusion that competition may increase each rms prot is quite
provocative and leads to several important implications, both from theoretical and policy-oriented
perspectives. We explore in some detail the consequences of this nding on the concept of free
entry equilibrium, showing it is quite indeterminate in industries with network externalities. We
propose the concept of strong free entry equilibrium as a renement that leads to the free entry
equilibrium with the largest number of rms as unique outcome. Our renement requires some
pre-play communication amongst rms without the possibility of making binding agreements. Such
coordination, though pro-competitive in that it increases competition, may well engender antitrust
action.6
As a consequence of our last two results, a number of policy issues may need a fresh look and
some revisiting. There may be more scope for pro-competitive cooperation or coordination by rms
in network markets. One might observe a higher propensity for licensing, possibly coupled with
lower royalty rates; less patenting or a permissive attitude towards patent infringement; as well as
more product standardization in industries where each rm might possess its own separate network
of consumers. These likely policy consequences are similar to those one might expect to see as a
result of the fact that having more rms alleviates the start-up problem for the industry. In short,
when more competition can be necessary to get the industry started up, or to enhance each rms
prot in an ongoing industry, the usual trade-o¤s between consumer surplus and producer surplus
are no longer the norm, and it is not surprising that many pillars of conventional wisdom about
market behavior might need re-examining. Proper reaction to these new incentives for coordinated
action by market competitors might well require a substantial overhaul of existing antitrust policy
(Shapiro, 1996). This in turn ought to rely on extensive theoretical analysis focusing on the special
nature of industries with network externalities, and this is a primary motivation of the present work.
The e¤ects of entry on industry performance as reected in social welfare, consumer surplus and
industry prots also display some distinctive features compared to standard Cournot competition.
The demand-side economies of scale weaken the conditions under which social welfare increases with
more entry. In addition, if the cross-e¤ect on the inverse demand function is positive, it is possible
5This result already appears in the context of a model with an inverse demand function that is linear in output
and no costs of production in Economides (1996), who in turn formalizes a remark made by Katz and Shapiro (1985).
6Nocke, Stahl and Peitz (2007) and Hagiu (2009) consider some related issues in the context of two-sided markets
with product di¤erentiation.
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that consumer surplus decreases with n: Katz and Shapiro (1985) explain the intuition behind this
result: If the network externality is strong for the marginal consumer, then the increase in the
expected network caused by the change in the number of rms will raise his/her willingness to pay
for the good by more than that of the average consumer. As a consequence, the rms will be able to
raise price by more than the increase in the average consumers willingness to pay for the product
and consumer surplus will fall.
Another noteworthy aspect of this paper is that we provide several explicit examples with easy
closed-form solutions to illustrate in a simple way some of the conclusions we derive. In particular,
Example 1 captures most of the relevant features often associated with the telecommunications
industry in the literature.7
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, introduces the equilibrium
concept and the main assumptions. Section 3 proves existence of trivial and non-trivial equilibria,
and provides conditions for the equilibrium to be unique. Section 4 discusses the scope for network
e¤ects to broaden the set of possible outcomes. Section 5 studies industry viability. Section 6
analyzes output, price and per-rm prots as a function of the number of rms in the market.
Section 7 deals with free entry equilibrium in markets with network e¤ects. Section 8 looks at
market performance as reected in social welfare, consumer surplus and aggregate prots, again,
as a function of n. Section 9 contains all the proofs of this paper. Finally, an elementary and
self-contained review of the lattice-theoretic notions and results needed here forms the Appendix.
2 The analytical framework
This section presents the standard oligopoly model with network e¤ects along with the commonly
used equilibrium concept due to Katz and Shapiro (1985). In view of the more general nature of our
treatment, we rst enumerate all the needed assumptions we shall use later and their justication.
We consider a static model to analyze oligopolistic competition in industries with positive net-
work e¤ects, reected in consumerswillingness to pay being increasing in the number of other
agents acquiring the same good. The rmsproducts are homogeneous and perfectly compatible
7Some of the examples we construct below do not satisfy all the assumptions in this paper. Since the violations
are not critical in any way and analytical examples (with nice closed-form solutions that capture the features we want
to highlight) are hard to come by, we are not concerned by this issue.
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with each other, so there is a single network comprising the outputs of all rms in the industry.
The market is fully described by the inverse demand function P (Z; S) and the number of
identical rms n, each having cost function C (x), where x denotes the rms output, Z is the
aggregate output in the market and S represents the expected size of the network. The cost of
producing no output is zero: Considering that each consumer buys at most one unit of the good,
S also stands for the expected number of people buying the good. Sometimes, it will be useful to
express the production side in terms of average cost A (x) ; dened as C (x) =x with A (0) = C 0(0):
For a given S; each rms reaction correspondence is obtained by maximizing the prot function
 (x; y; S) = xP (x+ y; S)  C (x)
ex (y; S) = argmax f (x; y; S) : 0  x  Kg (1)
where x is the rms level of output, y the output of the other (n  1) rms in the market and
K > 0 the production capacity of each rm.
At equilibrium, all relevant quantities x; y; Z and  will be indexed by the underlying number
of rms n, e.g., we shall denote Zn the equilibrium industry output corresponding to n rms in the
market, and xin the equilibrium output of rm i. When clear from the context, we will avoid the
subindex i in the latter variable.
Each rm chooses its output level to maximize its prots under the assumptions that (i) con-
sumersexpectations about the size of the network, S; is given; and (ii) the output level of the other
rms, y, is xed. Alternatively, we may think of the rm as choosing total output Z = x+ y, given
the other rms cumulative output, y; and the expected size of the network, S, in which case, withe (Z; y; S) = (Z   y)P (Z; S)  C (Z   y)
eZ (y; S) = argmax fe (Z; y; S) : y  Z  y +Kg : (2)
Consistency requires eZ (y; S) = ex (y; S) + y:
An equilibrium in this game is a vector (x1n; x2n; :::; xnn) that satises the following conditions
1. xin 2 argmax
n
xP

x+
P
j 6=i xjn; S

  C (x) : 0  x  K
o
; and
2. S =
P
i xin.
Since the seminal paper by Katz and Shapiro (1985), this notion of equilibrium, known as
"Fullled Expectations Cournot Equilibrium (FECE)," has become standard for oligopolies with
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network e¤ects. It requires that both consumers and rms correctly predict the market outcome,
so that their beliefs are conrmed in equilibrium. While strategic in their choice of outputs in the
usual Cournot sense, rms are "network-size taking" in their perceived inability to directly inuence
customersexpectations of market size. One plausible justication for this is that rms are unable
to credibly commit to output levels that customers could observe and reliably use in formulating
expectations about network size (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).8
Viewing S as an inverse demand shift variable, condition 1 just describes the equilibrium in
standard Cournot competition with exogenous S. Let zn (S) denote the corresponding industry
output equilibrium correspondence. Adding condition 2, an aggregate output Zn 2 zn (S) consti-
tutes a FECE industry output if it satises Zn = S as well. As a consequence, if we graph zn (S)
as a function of S, the FECE industry outputs are all the points where this correspondence crosses
the 45 line. This idea will play a key role in both the proof of existence and the viability analysis.
Another, fully game-theoretic, interpretation of this equilibrium notion is in the context of a
two-stage game, wherein a market maker (or a regulator) announces an expected network size S
in the rst stage, and rms compete in Cournot fashion facing inverse demand P (Z; S) in the
second stage. If the market makers objective function is to minimize jS   zn (S)j, then to any
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game corresponds a FECE of the Cournot market with network
externalities, and vice-versa.
Whenever well-dened, we denote the maximal and minimal points of a set by an upper and
a lower bar, respectively. Thus, for instance, Zn and Zn are the highest and lowest industry
equilibrium outputs when there are n rms in the market.
Denote by W (Z; S) ,
R Z
0 P (t; S) dt  ZA (Z=n) the Marshallian social welfare when aggregate
output is Z; all rms produce the same quantity and the expected size of the network is S. Similarly,
consumer surplus is CS (Z; S) ,
R Z
0 P (t; S) dt  ZP (Z; S).
We now list the assumptions used in this paper, starting with a set of standard ones, followed
by more substantive conditions.
The standard assumptions are
(A1) P (:; :) is twice continuously di¤erentiable, P1 (Z; S) < 0 and P2 (Z; S) > 0.
8Were such commitment credible for rms, standard Cournot equilibrium with inverse demand P (Z;Z) would be
a more appropriate concept. A direct comparison between these two concepts appears in Katz and Shapiro (1985).
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(A2) C (:) is twice continuously di¤erentiable and increasing.
(A3) xi  K; for all rm i.
These are all commonly used assumptions, including P2 (Z; S) > 0, which reects positive net-
work e¤ects, or the property that consumerswillingness to pay increases in the expected number
of people who will buy the good. Assumption A3 imposes capacity constraints on the production
process of each rm, a convenient condition to force compact output sets in a setting where rms
may otherwise wish to produce unbounded output levels. Our results do not rely in any way on K
taking on any particular set of values, as in Amir and Lambson (2000).
The second set of assumptions are placed on two functions that play a key role in the overall
analysis. Let 1 (Z; y) denote the cross-partial derivative of e (Z; y; S) with respect to Z and y, and
2 (Z; S) the cross-partial derivative of logP (Z; S) with respect to Z and S, scaled by [P (Z; S)]
2 ;
1 (Z; y) =  P1 (Z; S) + C 00 (Z   y) and
2 (Z; S) = P (Z; S)P12 (Z; S)  P1 (Z; S)P2 (Z; S) :
The domains of 1 and 2 are '1  f(Z; y) : y  0; Z  yg and '2  f(Z; S) : Z  y; S  0g
respectively, both of which are lattices (in the product order).
The second set of assumptions is
(A4) 1 (Z; y) =  P1 (Z; S) + C 00 (Z   y) > 0 on '1.
(A5) 2 (Z; S) = P (Z; S)P12 (Z; S)  P1 (Z; S)P2 (Z; S) > 0 on '2.
(A6) P (Z; S)P11 (Z; S)  [P1 (Z; S)]2 < 0 on '2:
Assumptions A4 and A5 guarantee that the prot function e (Z; y; S) has strictly increasing
di¤erences on '1 and the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S), respectively. A4 allows for limited
scale economies in production, and has been justied in detail by Amir and Lambson (2000). A5 has
the precise economic interpretation that the elasticity of demand increases in the expected network
size S:9 In his pioneering study of the elementary microeconomic foundations of interdependent
demands, Leibenstein (1950) suggested that demand is more elastic in network markets because
9The price elasticity of demand is  

@P (Z;S)
@Z
Z
P (Z;S)
 1
=  

Z @ logP (Z;S)
@Z
 1
; which is increasing in S if and
only if logP (Z; S) has increasing di¤erences in (Z; S) (Topkis, 1998, p. 66).
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individual reactions to price changes are followed by additional reactions, in the same direction,
to each others change in consumption.10 A5 essentially captures the cumulative e¤ect of these
mutually reinforcing e¤ects on aggregate demand. Another plausible interpretation of A5 is that it
formalizes the concept of demand-side scale economies that is often postulated as a characteristic of
network e¤ects in the literature, though not in a precise manner. In terms of the model structure,
the direct e¤ects of A4 and A5 in the upcoming analysis are that eZ (y; S) increases in y and S,
respectively.
A6 assurances that P (Z; S) is log-concave in Z. This is a generalized concavity condition that
guarantees that eZ (y; S) is a single-valued function. While most results in this paper do not require
the latter assumption, A6 is crucially needed for the uniqueness property in Theorem 7.
3 Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
In this section we provide a general abstract equilibrium existence result, exploiting the minimal
monotonic structure of the model reected in A4-A5. Then we derive additional su¢ cient conditions
that guarantee the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive industry
output. We nally provide conditions for the equilibrium to be unique.
3.1 Existence of FECE
We begin with the central monotonicity result, which is a direct consequence of A4 and A5.
Lemma 1 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then, every selection of the best-response correspondenceeZ (y; S) is increasing in both y and S.
This lemma leads to an abstract existence result for symmetric equilibrium, along with the fact
that the same assumptions preclude the possibility of asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then, for each n 2 N , the Cournot oligopoly with
network e¤ects has (at least) one symmetric equilibrium and no asymmetric equilibria.
10Although Leibenstein referred to the concept of positively interdependent demands as "bandwagon e¤ect," it is
essentially identical to the network e¤ect we analyze in this paper.
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Theorem 2 extends the existence results in the literature of network goods to a very general
setting. Specically, it dispenses with two assumptions often observed: no cross-e¤ects on the
demand side and constant marginal costs of production (see Katz and Shapiro, 1985, Economides
and Himmelberg, 1995, and Economides, 1996, among others).
Comparing the conditions we impose here with those in standard Cournot competition, the only
new requirement is that the price elasticity of demand increases with the network size (A5), taking
P2 (Z; S) > 0 as a natural property of network markets. Analogs of all other assumptions are also
needed for proving existence in the standard Cournot model, as reected in Theorem 2.1, Amir and
Lambson (2000), reproduced in the next Lemma.
Lemma 3 Assume A1-A4 are satised. Then, for each n 2 N ,
(i) the standard Cournot oligopoly (with exogenous S) has a symmetric equilibrium and no asym-
metric equilibria;
(ii) if in addition A5 holds, the maximal and minimal selections of zn (S), zn (S) and zn (S),
increase in S; and
(iii) if in addition A5-A6 hold, zn (:) is a single-valued and continuous function.
In Section 2 we noted that a xed point of zn (S) constitutes a FECE industry output. As a
consequence, statements (i) and (ii) in the last lemma could be used to show equilibrium existence
through Tarskis Theorem. Although less direct than the approach behind Theorem 2, this idea
plays a key role in the proof of existence of a non-trivial equilibrium.
In network markets, the trivial (zero-production) outcome is often an equilibrium. This phe-
nomenon intensies when the network good has little stand-alone value (i.e. P (Z; 0) is small): given
any such good, if end users believe no one else will acquire it, the good will have no value, and the
trivial outcome will necessarily be part of the equilibrium set. Telecommunications industries, such
as faxes, phones and e-mails, typically exhibit this characteristic.
In such markets, Theorem 2 is not of much interest since the underlying equilibrium may a
priori be the trivial one, the presence of which can be characterized in more direct fashion. To
complete the analysis, we rst provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the trivial equilibrium
to arise. We then add some extra assumptions to ensure the existence of (at least) one non-trivial
equilibrium.
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Lemma 4 The trivial outcome is an equilibrium if and only if xP (x; 0)  C (x) for all x 2 [0;K] :
This lemma simply says that the trivial outcome is part of the equilibrium set if and only if
when the common expectation (amongst rms and consumers) about the size of the network is zero,
and a rm believes the other rms will produce no output, the best it can do under the required
condition is to produce zero as well. The proof follows directly from the denition of FECE. Since
this condition is independent of n, the existence of the trivial outcome is a¤ected neither by entry
nor by exit of rms in the market.
The next result provides alternative su¢ cient conditions to ensure the existence of a non-trivial
equilibrium, i.e. one with strictly positive industry output.
Theorem 5 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then, there exists a non-trivial equilibrium if at least
one of the following conditions is also fullled
(i) zero is not an equilibrium output (i.e. the condition of Lemma 4 does not hold);
(ii) zero is an equilibrium output, P (0; 0) = C 0(0), n > [ P1 (0; 0) + C 00 (0)] = [P1 (0; 0) + P2 (0; 0)]
and P1 (0; 0) + P2 (0; 0) > 0; or
(iii) zero is an equilibrium output, C 00 (:)  0 and the next condition is satised
(n  1)
Z bZ
Z
P (t; S) dt+
h bZP  bZ; S  ZP (Z; S)i  n2 hC  bZ=n  C (Z=n)i  0 (3)
for some S 2 (0; nK], some bZ  S and all Z  S.
Theorem 2 ensures equilibrium existence. Therefore, if the trivial outcome is not part of the
equilibrium set, there must be an equilibrium with a strictly positive industry output, and the rst
statement in Theorem 5 follows. This applies only to network goods with positive stand-alone value.
The extra requirements in (ii) guarantee that, although zn (0) = 0, zn (S) starts above the
45 line near 0: The existence of a non-trivial equilibrium follows now in view of Lemma 3 (ii).
Formally, this derives from applying Tarskis Theorem to zn (S) for S 2 [; nK], given some  > 0
small enough. As expected, the stronger the network e¤ect around the origin is, as captured by
P2 (0; 0) ; the less stringent the existence condition for the non-trivial equilibrium gets (i.e. the lower
the threshold value of n is).
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Condition (3) ensures that, although zn (0) = 0, zn (S) is above the 45 line at some S 2 (0; nK],
so a non-trivial equilibrium exists by Tarskis Theorem applied to zn (:) mapping [S; nK] to itself.
An interpretation of (3), involving the evaluation of a weighted combination of welfare and prots
(see Bergstrom and Varian, 1985), is given in Section 9 (see Lemma 25).
The proof of Theorem 5 uses the following intermediate result, which also plays a key role in
the viability analysis (Section 4).
Lemma 6 Assume A1-A5 are satised. If 0 2 zn (0), then zn (0) = 0; i.e. zn (0) is single-valued.
If in addition P (0; 0) = C 0(0), the slope of zn (:) is also single-valued and right-continuous at 0, and
z0n (0) =
nP2(0; 0)
  (n+ 1)P1(0; 0) + C 00 (0) : (4)
If the trivial equilibrium is not interior, i.e. P (0; 0) < C 0(0), then z0n (0) = 0:
This lemma shows the trivial equilibrium has interesting properties. Although zn (:) might a
priori be multi-valued, i.e. a correspondence, when zero is part of the equilibrium set, it is single-
valued at the origin. If in addition the trivial equilibrium is interior, the slope of this function is
given by (4) and depends on n.
3.2 Uniqueness of FECE
The possibility of multiple equilibria in markets with network e¤ects is more a norm than an
exception. Multiple equilibria are due to the positive feedback that derives from expectations: If
consumers believe the good will not succeed, it will usually fail. On the contrary, if they expect it
to succeed, it will usually succeed.
In this subsection, we assume A6 is satised, in addition to A1-A5. The added benet of A6 is
to ensure that zn (:) is single-valued and continuous, as shown in Lemma 3 (iii). Although A6 is
su¢ cient for uniqueness in standard Cournot competition (see Amir and Lambson, 2000), the same
result here requires an additional condition related to the function
f (Z; n) , n f[P (Z;Z)  C
0(Z=n)]P12(Z;Z)  P1(Z;Z)P2(Z;Z)g
(n+ 1) [P1(Z;Z)]
2   n [P (Z;Z)  C 0(Z=n)]P11(Z;Z)  P1(Z;Z)C 00(Z=n)
: (5)
The function f (Z; n) describes the slope of zn (S) with respect to S along the diagonal path, i.e.
at S = Z: The next theorem shows uniqueness of FECE.
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Theorem 7 In addition to A1-A6, assume f (Z; n) < 1 for all Z in [0; nK]. Then, the Cournot
game with network e¤ects has a unique and symmetric FECE, which coincides with the trivial
equilibrium if and only if the condition of Lemma 4 holds.
The proof of this theorem is simple. Assuming A1-A6 are satised, zn (:) is single-valued and
continuous. If in addition f (Z; n) is everywhere lower than one, then the slope of zn (:) along the
diagonal is lower than one as well. The uniqueness result now follows directly from this observation,
since any two adjacent xed points of zn (:) must include one for which f (Z; n) is equal or larger
than one.
It is readily veried that f (Z; n) increases in P2(Z;Z), suggesting that network e¤ects increase
the possibility of multiple equilibria. This nding reinforces our earlier comment.
The assumptions of Theorem 7 are su¢ cient, but not necessary, to ensure uniqueness, in the
tradition of methods based on degree theory (Dierker, 1972). Although our condition is not globally
satised in the less general model of Katz and Shapiro (1985), their equilibrium is unique anyway.
4 On the theoretical scope of network e¤ects
In view of the need for an expectations-based equilibrium concept instead of one of the standard
concepts of oligopolistic behavior centered on Nash equilibrium, it is natural to investigate the
extent to which the presence of these expectations enlarges the scope of possible outcomes in network
industries. One meaningful way to frame such a question is to characterize the class of functions that
could emerge as possible equilibrium industry outputs given network size S, i.e., as possible selections
of the Cournot equilibrium correspondence zn (S).11 Some simple insights into this question can
be derived by considering an industry with n rms, no costs of production and the specic inverse
demand function
P (Z; S) = exp[ nZ=h(S)] (6)
11This is reminiscent of the question of what constitutes a valid aggregate excess demand function in general
equilibrium theory, which led to the well-known Debreu-Mantel-Sonnenschein theorem (Mas-Colell, Whinson and
Green, 1995). It is also in the same vein as the issue of what constitutes a valid optimal policy in Ramsey-type
dynamic optimization models (Boldrin and Montrucchio, 1986). The answers provided in these two di¤erent settings
were similarly broad, in that any function with minimal regularity conditions is a valid outcome function. Hence, the
conclusions were that the two underlying theories impose very little structure on their respective outcome functions.
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with h0(:)  0 (see Amir and Lambson, 2000):
For regular Cournot oligopoly (with demand function (6) and exogenous S), there is a unique
Cournot equilibrium and it is in dominant strategies: x = h(S)=n, so zn (S) = h(S): Hence
rms have constant reactions curves, and may thus be viewed as essentially non-strategic and fully
predictable in their behavior.
The FECE solve the xed-point relation Z = h(S) = S. Since f is so far an arbitrary function,
h(S) = S may have no solutions at all (if h (:) does not intersect the 45 line), or as many solutions
(or FECE points) as h (:) has xed points. In particular, if h (:) is taken to be the identity function,
anything at all is a FECE, and the model has no predictive power whatsoever!
This argument shows rather strikingly the scope of possible new outcomes that expectations
or network e¤ects can generate, which have no counterparts in the corresponding regular Cournot
oligopoly. Indeed, this illustration has an "anything goes" avor of a rather extreme kind. This
construction also illustrates the potential for multiple equilibria in the presence of network e¤ects,
along with new issues to face for testing such models (Echenique and Komunjer, 2009).
This specication will be invoked repeatedly below to design nice closed-form examples that
illustrate particular results.
5 Industry viability
In this section, we provide an extensive treatment of industry viability, via a formalization of ex-
pectations dynamics, and a key result on the e¤ects of market structure and exogenous technological
improvements on this issue.
Many studies suggest that the left panel of Figure 1 reects the structure of the telecommuni-
cations industries. The underlying game there displays three possible equilibria, the trivial equilib-
rium, a middle unstable equilibrium, usually called critical mass, and a high stable equilibrium.12
The justication of this conguration is quite simple: If all the consumers expect that no one will
acquire the good, then the good has no value and no one will end up buying it, resulting in the
12There are several denitions of the notion of critical mass in the literature, some in dynamic settings and others in
static settings. In the present paper, we wish to adapt the most common denition, which is as the smallest non-zero
(Cournot-) unstable FECE, to our framework taking into account the multi-valuedness of zn(S): The formal denition
is given below.
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Figure 1: Viability and Basin of Attraction of the Trivial Equilibrium
trivial equilibrium for the industry. However, if expectations are higher to start with, another,
non-trivial, equilibria will prevail.
Whenever the trivial equilibrium is locally stable in expectations (as in Figure 1), one possibility
is that the market never emerges as a result of an expected size of the network that is too low to
start with. In view of the equilibrium concept adopted here, the incumbent rms are simply unable
to inuence these expectations to get them past the critical mass. Under such conditions, even if the
industry does get going, Cournot equilibrium on the basis of small expectations cannot lead rms to
produce enough output to generate prospects beyond the critical mass, and the industry will unravel
through a natural process towards the trivial equilibrium. This argument is commonly invoked to
capture the start-up problem that frequently a¤ects these markets, and is often referred to as the
"chicken and egg" paradox. Oren and Smith (1981) o¤er an early discussion of this phenomenon in
electronic communication markets.
The tacit dynamic process underlying this analysis can be formalized through the following
expectations/network size recursion, starting from any initial S0  0,
Sk = bzn (Sk 1) ; k  1 (7)
where bzn will denote either the maximal or minimal selection of zn, as will be specied.
This process thus begins with a historically given initial expectation S0, then postulates that
rms react by engaging in Cournot competition with demand P (Z; S0), leading to an industry
output bzn (S0). The latter will in turn determine consumers expectation S1 = bzn (S0), and the
process repeats indenitely. This yields a sequential adjustment process in which consumers and
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rms behave myopically with respect to the size of the network. Taking a single-valued selection of
zn(S) amounts to selecting one particular Cournot equilibrium for each given S.
For each increasing selection of zn(S), denoted by bzn (S), we can formally dene the correspond-
ing critical mass as the smallest initial expectation bS0 such that for all S0 > bS0, the orbit given by
(7) converges to a nonzero FECE. This denition captures the notion of critical mass irrespective
of whether the selection at hand is continuous, or continuous from one side only (i.e. right or left),
or neither, at that specic point. In the right panel of Figure 1, there is a whole interval of critical
masses, each corresponding to a di¤erent monotonic selection of zn(S).
Since we will consider explicitly the dynamics in (7) as given by the two extremal selections,
reected in the right panel of Figure 1, the usual notions of stability need to be adapted accord-
ingly.13
Denition 8 The trivial equilibrium is best-case (worst-case) stable if there is a right neighborhood
V of 0 such that for all S0 in V; the orbit Sk = zn (Sk 1)! 0 (Sk = zn (Sk 1)! 0), as k !1:
Here, the qualication of best-case and worst-case refers to the type of Cournot equilibrium
selection given network size S. Indeed, as is intuitive, the maximal (minimal) selection is most
(least) favorable for the viability of the industry. Note that in the right panel of Figure 1, CM2 and
CM3 are the best-case and worst-case critical masses, respectively.
Let V bn (V
w
n ) denote the largest set of values of S0 for which the trivial equilibrium is best-case
(worst-case) stable. We shall refer to V bn and V
w
n as the best and worst-case basins of attraction of
the trivial equilibrium, respectively.
In view of Lemma 6, when zero is a FECE aggregate output, both zn and zn are continuously
di¤erentiable at 0 with z0n (0) = z0n (0). Assuming henceforth that this derivative is (generically)
not equal to 1, 0 is an isolated equilibrium (for a formal proof, see e.g., Granas and Dugundji, 2003,
pp. 326-327). Since in addition, zn and zn are increasing in S, both V
b
n and V
w
n are intervals.
14 In
the left panel of Figure 1, where zn (:) is single-valued, these two intervals coincide and are equal
to (0; CM1); in the right panel of that gure zn and zn induce V
b
n = (0; CM2) and V
w
n = (0; CM3],
respectively.15
13Related issues are addressed in some detail in Echenique (2002).
14Since zn is u.h.c., zn = min zn is l.s.c. and left-continuous, and zn = max zn is u.s.c. and right-continuous. Hence,
V bn is open at its upper bound while V
w
n may or may not be.
15The fact that V bn is open and V
w
n is right-closed follows from both Figure 1 and Footnote 14.
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Each industry can be classied into one of three possible categories in terms of best-case or
worstcase viability.
Denition 9 An industry is said to be
(i) best-case (worst-case) uniformly viable if every orbit in (7) with bzn = zn(zn) converges to
some non-zero equilibrium starting from any S0 > 0;
(ii) best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable if, for zn(zn); the same convergence as in (i) takes
place only from su¢ ciently high S0; and
(iii) best-case (worst-case) nonviable if every orbit in (7) with bzn = zn(zn) converges to 0 from any
S0  0.
This denition extends in the obvious way to any increasing selection of zn(S), in which case
one simply removes the qualiers "best-case" and "worst-case." Thus, for any increasing selectionbzn (S), the critical mass is 0 if the industry is uniformly viable, 1 if it is nonviable, and satises
the next conditions bS0 > 0; lim
S"bS0 bzn (S)  bS0  limS#bS0 bzn (S)
if the industry is conditionally viable.16
The next result provides su¢ cient conditions for each viability outcome by linking them to our
previous results on the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium.
Proposition 10 Assume A1-A5 are satised. An industry is
(i) worst-case uniformly viable if and only if either condition (i) or (ii) of Theorem 5 holds;
(ii) best-case conditionally viable if condition (iii) of Theorem 5 holds; and
(iii) best-case nonviable if the conditions of Lemma 4 and Theorem 7 hold.
To provide a basis for comparing two di¤erent situations that might prevail for the same industry,
we need to formalize a partial order for increasing viability.
16 In other words, there will always exist a unique critical mass for a given increasing selection. A formal proof can
be easily given, relying only on the well-known properties of monotonic functions, in particular that all discontinuities
are of the rst kind.
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Denition 11 The best-case (worse-case) viability of an industry is said to increase if either
(i) the industry goes from best-case (worst-case) nonviable to best-case (worst-case) conditionally
viable, or from the latter to best-case (worst-case) uniformly viable; or
(ii) the industry is best-case (worst-case) conditionally viable and V bn (V
w
n ) contracts.
The next result, a key nding of this paper, shows that additional rms in the market and/or a
technological improvement always enhance the viability of a network industry.17 Examples 1 and 2
below illustrate these important e¤ects. We capture exogenous technological change by a decrease
in  for the cost function C(:).
Theorem 12 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then,
(i) both zn(:) and zn(:) shift up as n increases and/or  decreases. Hence, more rms in the
market and/or technological improvements always increase the best-case and worst-case viability of
the industry; and
(ii) if the trivial outcome is an equilibrium (i.e. the condition of Lemma 4 holds) and P1 (0; 0)+
P2 (0; 0)  0, an industry cannot be uniformly viable for any n (even in best-case).
Theorem 12 captures the key role of market structure on industry viability: having more rms
around implies that a lower critical mass would be needed to launch a given industry. The underlying
intuition is intimately connected to the FECE concept, as discussed next. Consider the natural
question: In case S0 happens to be below the critical mass, why cant the existing rms attempt
to act as if there were more of them by producing a higher output level in an e¤ort to inuence
consumersexpectations of the network size upwards? In a context where the appropriate solution
concept is FECE, rms presumably cannot commit to their desired output levels in a credible way,
and, likewise, attempting to inate their number by committing to a higher output would also not
be credible, and would thus not constitute behavior compatible with the FECE concept.
In industries with multiple rms having their own versions of the same general good, this result
might explain why rms often settle for full compatibility between their products, instead of in-
compatibility. Their objective is to generate a single industry network that would be viable, when
17Economides and Himmelberg (1995) show that, under some conditions, market structure has no e¤ect on the
critical mass. Our results do not coincide because we dene critical mass in a di¤erent way.
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separate networks with one rm each would not be. This implies that some form of cooperation
amongst direct rivals could be needed for their products to succeed. One example is the case of
Sony and Philips, who jointly created industry standards for compact disc in the mid 80s (Shapiro,
1996). Such forms of cooperation have no counterparts in non-network markets.
The last theorem also captures the fundamental e¤ect of an exogenous technological change on
industry viability. A technological improvement also lowers the critical mass that would be needed
to start the market up. This result is consistent with observed market behavior. The fax market
took decades beyond the discovery of the initial technology to get started (Shapiro and Varian,
1998). Now and then, an attempt at launching a new product with network e¤ects is seen to fail.
One plausible diagnosis according to the present analysis is that the product might be too costly at
the early stages of the emerging industry.18
Example 1. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs, and inverse
demand function given by
P (Z; S) = exp

  2Z
exp(1  1=S)

with Z; S 2 [0; nK] :
The reaction function of a rm is ex (y; S) = (1=2) exp(1  1=S): Since each rm has a dominant
strategy, ex (y; S) does not depend on y, and we can add the reaction functions to obtain
zn (S) = (n=2) exp(1  1=S):
An equilibrium industry output solves zn (Z) = Z in Z. Then we have: Z1 = f0g, Z2 = f0; 1g,
Z3 = f0; 0:457; 2:882g and Z4 = f0; 0:373; 4:311g, as shown in Figure 2.
As can be easily seen, the trivial equilibrium is always stable. With only one rm in the market,
this is the only equilibrium, so the industry is nonviable. With one extra rm, a larger equilibrium
emerges and the industry becomes conditionally viable (barely, since zn (:) is tangent to the 45
line). For a larger number of rms, the equilibrium conguration encompasses three equilibria; the
two extreme ones are stable and the intermediate one is unstable. The unstable equilibrium, often
called critical mass, decreases in n. This is an exact closed-form example of the three-equilibrium
constellation that is often portrayed as typical in many network industries.
18The quality of the production technology can also be a key factor in determining start-up success, but in the
present context this can only be captured partly via the cost function.
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Figure 2: Viability and Market Structure
Here, zn (:) shifts up as n increases (cf. Theorem 12). The industry goes from nonviable to
conditionally viable as n goes from 1 to 2 rms. As n further increases, viability increases since the
basin of attraction of 0 shrinks, but uniform viability is never attained since P1(0; 0) + P2(0; 0) = 0
(cf. Theorem 12). 
In our rst example, initial expectations must be high enough to start the market up (when
n  2). Although the critical mass shrinks as the number of rms increases, the start-up problem
always exists. The next example shows an extreme case where this problem disappears with a
technological improvement.
Example 2. Consider the cost function C(x) = cx, c > 0, and the inverse demand function
P (Z; S) = exp

  Z
bS

with Z; S 2 [0; nK] and b > 0:
Here  captures technological improvements. The prot function is
 (x; y; S) =

exp

 x+ y
bS

x  cx:
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Figure 3: Viability and Technological Improvements
The reaction function of any given rm is implicitly dened by
exp

 ex (y; S) + y
bS

1  ex (y; S) + y
nbS

  c = 0 (8)
when ex (y; S) is interior. When the left hand side of (8) is negative for all ex 2 [0;K] then ex (y; S) = 0,
and it takes the value K when the left hand side of (8) is positive for all ex 2 [0;K] :
The aggregate equilibrium output with exogenous S, zn (S), is implicitly dened by
exp

 zn (S)
bS

1  zn (S)
nbS

  c = 0 (9)
when zn (S) is interior. Otherwise, zn (S) is either 0 or nK.
Figure 3 illustrates the FECE for n = 10 and b = 2, given three possible values of c: 1=4, 1=2
and 1. When the technology is costly, c = 1; zn (S) is 0 for all S. Then the trivial equilibrium is
the unique FECE, and the industry is nonviable. After technological improvements, c = 1=2 and
c = 1=4, every orbit in (7) converges to nK starting from any S0 > 0, so the industry becomes
uniformly viable. 
The rst example illustrates an interesting situation where the presence of network e¤ects might
have unusual implications on rmsattitudes towards intellectual property rights and entry deter-
rence. Indeed, rms will not be tempted to engage in entry deterrence activities if their number is
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insu¢ cient to start the market up. In such a case, those in possession of patents will have a much
higher than usual incentive to engage in licensing, and will even nd it in their interest to give their
patents away to their competitors. Naturally, such generosity will prevail only until the industry is
started up, or until prots cease to increase with the number of competitors, as we shall see below.
The second example shows the key e¤ect of technological improvements on the viability of the
industry. Even with a large number of potential competitors, the market might not start up until
the industry manages to lower production costs su¢ ciently.
6 Equilibrium price, outputs and prots
This section studies the e¤ects of market structure on the equilibrium industry output, per-rm
output, market price and per-rm prots. Amir and Lambson (2000) address similar questions
regarding the standard Cournot competition, we show next that network e¤ects introduce new
interesting features.
The analysis that follows makes all the statements on the largest equilibrium, i.e. the one with
the largest equilibrium outputs, namely, Zn and xn. When the trivial outcome is an equilibrium, it
is also the smallest equilibrium. Since it is invariant in the number of rms, the comparative statics
questions below are of no interest for that equilibrium. When the trivial outcome is not part of the
equilibrium set, then our conclusions also apply to the minimal selections, Zn and xn.
Let us dene the interval In = [Zn; Zn+1]: Our rst theorem relates new entry to equilibrium
industry output and market price.
Theorem 13 Assume conditions A1-A5 are satised. Then, we have
(i) the extremal equilibrium industry outputs, Zn and Zn, increase in n; and
(ii) if P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)  () 0 on In, then P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  ()P  Zn; Zn :
Theorem 13 (i) is also true in standard Cournot competition, as shown by Amir and Lambson
(2000), Theorem 2.2 (b). In the latter, the usual law of demand su¢ ces for the market price
to decrease after new entry. As Theorem 13 (ii) indicates, the e¤ect of entry on market price is
ambiguous when network e¤ects prevail. The reason is that when industry output increases the rms
must set the price low enough to attract the marginal consumer, but when more buyers join the
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network consumerswillingness to pay increases. Thus the overall e¤ect of entry on the market price
depends on how relevant the output e¤ect is compared to the network e¤ect. As a consequence, the
so-called property of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar assumptions holds in the standard
Cournot game, is not satised here.
To make inferences about the e¤ects of entry on equilibrium per-rm outputs and prots, we
need to introduce a new function
g (Z) =

P (Z;Z)  C 0 (Z=n) [P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z)]  P1 (Z;Z) [P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)] : (10)
A detailed description of the determinants of function g (:) is o¤ered later, assuming no costs of
production.
Theorem 14 In addition to A1-A5, assume Zn and Zn+1 are interior equilibria. Then, we have
(i) if g (Z)  0 on In, the largest per-rm equilibrium output increases in n, i.e. xn+1  xn; and
(ii) if g (Z)  0 on In, the largest per-rm equilibrium output decreases in n, i.e. xn+1  xn:
In short, this result means that the scope for the business-stealing e¤ect, which is nearly universal
in standard Cournot oligopoly (at least in a global sense), is quite a bit narrower in the presence of
network externalities. On the other hand, the scope for the opposite, or business-enhancing, e¤ect
is much broader in the present setting, as we see next.
Corollary 15 In addition to the conditions of Theorem 14, assume no costs of production. If the
next condition holds on In, for which log-convexity of P (Z; S) in Z is a su¢ cient condition,
[P (Z;Z)P12 (Z;Z)  P1 (Z;Z)P2 (Z;Z)] +

P (Z;Z)P11 (Z;Z)  P 21 (Z;Z)
  0 (11)
then xn+1  xn.
The left-hand side of (11) is the same as g (Z) when the rms face no production costs. Its
rst term is positive by A5, and log-convexity of P (Z; S) in Z ensures the second one is positive
as well. Therefore log-convexity is a su¢ cient, but not necessary, condition for the highest per-rm
equilibrium output to increase after new entry whenever marginal costs are zero. Amir and Lambson
(2000), Theorem 2.3, require log-convexity to globally ensure the same result for standard Cournot
competition. Hence network e¤ects facilitate this unusual outcome.
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Based on Theorems 13 and 14, the following result deals with the e¤ects of entry on per-rm
equilibrium prots. Recall that in standard Cournot oligopoly, the only part of the conventional
wisdom about the e¤ects of competition that is universally valid is that per-rm prots decline with
the number of competitors (Amir and Lambson, 2000, and Amir, 2003). We now show that in the
presence of network e¤ects, this result can be easily reversed.
Theorem 16 In addition to A1-A5, assume Zn and Zn+1 are interior equilibria. Then, we have
(i) if P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)  0 and g (Z)  0 on In, at the largest equilibrium, n+1  n; and
(ii) if P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)  0 and g (Z)  0 on In, at the largest equilibrium, n+1  n:
The rst result provides su¢ cient conditions for the rms in the market to prefer further entry
by new rms. It generalizes a result in Economides (1996), based on a more specic formulation,
which in turn formalizes a remark made by Katz and Shapiro (1985).
Although surprising, the intuition for this outcome is simple. New entry increases the equilibrium
industry output, as shown in Theorem 13, and a direct e¤ect is that market price goes down by the
usual law of demand. But via the e¤ect on the size of the network, this output increase also shifts
the inverse demand function up, thus pushing for a price increase. Then, if the overall e¤ect on the
market price is positive and each rm increases own output, the existing rms in the market are
better-o¤ after new entry. As Economides (1996) states, if the externalities are strong, the network
e¤ect dominates the usual competitive e¤ect of entry.
A natural question arises when prots increase in n. Why cant the existing rms attempt to
act as if there were more of them in order to each get higher prots at equilibrium? Since they
would do so by producing a higher output level in an e¤ort to inuence consumersexpectations
of the network size upward, the answer is the same as for the start-up problem: the tacit lack of
commitment power on the part of the rms, which is at the heart of the FECE concept.
The next result follows as a simple corollary of our last theorem. Its extra requirement captures
(as a special case) one of the conditions often imposed in the network models: no second order
e¤ects on the inverse demand function.
Corollary 17 In addition to the conditions of Theorems 14 and 16, assume P11 (Z;Z)+P12 (Z;Z) =
0, for all Z. If P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)  () 0 on In, then, at the largest equilibrium,
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(i) per-rm equilibrium output increases (decreases) in n, i.e. xn+1  ()xn; and
(ii) per-rm equilibrium prots increase (decrease) in n, i.e. n+1  ()n.
The new condition in Corollary 17, P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z) = 0; is satised if, for example,
P (Z; S) = h (S) kZ with h(:) an increasing function, or P (Z; S) = f (S   Z) with f (:) increasing
on the reals.
We end this section with an example that highlights the implications of Theorem 16. The next
section will explain how these results a¤ect the standard characterization of the free entry number
of rms.
Example 3. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs, and inverse
demand function given by
P (Z; S) = max fa+ bS   Z; 0g with Z; S 2 [0; nK] ; a  0; b > 0 and  2 (0; 1) :
Assuming K is large enough, the reaction function of any given rm is
ex (y; S) = max f(a+ bS   y) =2; 0g :
After a simple computation, the symmetric equilibrium industry output is implicitly dened by
 Zn (1 + n) + na+ nbZn = 0:
Let a = 10; b = 5 and  = 4=5: Using a numerical approach, per-rm equilibrium prots for
di¤erent values of n are
1  14; 561 < 2  49; 255 < 3  67; 316 < 4  70; 676
5  67; 288 > 6  61; 520 > 7  55; 301 > 8  49; 404 > ::: > 21  14; 444:
We observe that when the number of rms is small, n = 1; 2 or 3; incumbent rms are better
o¤ if an extra rm enters the market. When n  4, rms are worse-o¤ after new entry. Consider
for instance a situation where entry costs are 14; 440. Then a single rm in the market would
barely make a positive prot, and potential entrants might decide to stay out if they based their
assessment on standard oligopoly settings (due to prots just covering entry costs). Yet, the market
could actually accommodate a full 21 rms at the unique free entry equilibrium! 
The next section explores some other consequences of the presence of network e¤ects on the
well-known concept of free entry equilibrium.
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7 Free entry and FECE
Consider the standard problem of free entry as a two-stage game (e.g. Mankiw and Whinston,
1986). In the rst stage, each of an innite number of rms decides whether to enter the industry or
not, knowing the entry cost EC. In the second stage, upon observing the number of entrants, rms
engage in standard Cournot competition. The free entry (subgame-perfect) equilibrium number of
rms ne is then dened by
ne  EC; ne+1 < EC: (12)
These conditions simply state that the ne rms that entered and those that did not do not re-
gret their decisions. Assuming a unique Cournot equilibrium in the second stage, the free entry
equilibrium number of rms is uniquely dened (ignoring the integer constraint) by the zero-prot
condition ne = EC since n is always decreasing in n.
In the present setting with network e¤ects, we can also dene free entry equilibrium as a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game, upon replacing the Cournot equilibrium in
the second stage by a FECE selection, assumed to be a non-trivial one (as we do in this section).19
We now investigate the consequences of keeping the standard denition of free entry equilibrium as
given in (12).
In light of Theorem 16, the concept of free entry equilibrium may not be well-behaved for
network industries.20 The equilibrium number of rms ne need not be uniquely dened as n may
intersect the horizontal line at EC more than once, with the free entry equilibria being only those
for which this intersection is from above to below.21
To x ideas, let us focus on the situation depicted in Figure 4. There are two free entry equilibria,
n1 and n3 according to the denition given above. We assume in what follows that n3 > EC and
n3+1 < EC, which holds generically (thus, in contrast to much of the literature, we are not ignoring
the integer constraint, and this will turn out to be crucial below). Clearly, with n1 rms in the
market, no single rm outside the market would wish to deviate and enter on its own. However, a
group of n3   n1 rms outside the market could form a coalitional deviation all enter the market
19As an abuse of terminology, we ignore here the fact that FECE is not a fully game-theoretic concept.
20To begin with, FECE are often not unique, so to each FECE corresponds at least one free entry equilibrium. In
particular, the presence of the trivial equilibrium would lead to no entry always being a free entry equilibrium.
21 In Example 3, it is of interest to observe that, although n is inverse U-shaped in n; the free entry number of
rms is nevertheless uniquely dened for any level of EC.
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Figure 4: Free-entry and Network E¤ects
that would be benecial to all coalition members. With n3 rms in the market, no coalition has
a protable deviation (we are assuming that, consistent with Figure 4, n < EC for all n > n3).22
Hence, there is a unique strong Nash equilibrium, which is also coalition-proof, in the one-shot game
with payo¤s written as functions of the two possible rst-stage actions (enter and do not enter) for
each rm, given a non-trivial FECE in the second stage. This induces what we might refer to as a
unique strong (and coalition-proof) free entry equilibrium with n3 rms in. The latter is also the
Pareto-dominant free entry equilibrium if n3  n1 , but not otherwise.23
Clearly, the underlying ideas behind this discussion are quite general. In case of multiple free
entry equilibria, only one is also coalition-proof and it is always the free entry equilibrium with
the highest number of rms in the market. This equilibrium clearly has a lot of intuitive appeal
from an applied perspective, since the free entry number of rms is often thought of as the largest
number of rms that a market can sustain. It is thus reasonable to suggest coalition-proofness as a
renement to the notion of free entry equilibrium in markets with network e¤ects.24
On the other hand, for this equilibrium to arise, some pre-play communication without the
22Here again, we are using the assumption n3 > EC, since without it, there would be a protable coalitonal
deviation to the n1 equilibrium in case n1 > n3 .
23A general remark about the common simplifying assumption of ignoring the integer constraint in the standard
oligopoly literature is in order. If ne = EC holds, then each rm is indi¤erent between entering and not entering.
So if one of the ne rms went out of the market, we would still have a free entry equilibrium, which actually Pareto-
dominates the original ne-rm equilibrium since ne 1 > ne . Thus ignoring the integer constraint is not as innocuous
as it seems. One way out is to assume the (rather arbitrary) tie-breaking rule that, when indi¤erent, a rm always
chooses to enter.
24Delgado and Moreno (2004) use coalition-proofness as a renement to narrow down the set of supply function
equilibria in an oligopolistic setting.
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option of making binding agreements might well be needed, as is the case with coalition-based
equilibrium notions in general. Such coordination of entry decisions by rms might well violate
existing antitrust legislation in practice.
In conclusion, the presence of network e¤ects creates quite some novel features as far as the
central problem of free entry is concerned, and some of these might call for some new antitrust
legislation allowing for entry coordination (i.e. pre-play communication) between competitors. The
latter will also introduce some new scope for useful coordinating activities by other actors, such as
business associations. These conclusions reinforce the earlier ndings that the start-up phase of a
network industry might call for new forms of inter-rm cooperation.
8 Social welfare, consumer surplus and industry prots
This section studies the e¤ects of an exogenous change in the number of rms on social welfare,
consumer surplus and industry prots. As in the previous section, we continue to focus on the highest
equilibrium outputs, Zn and xn. Our aim is to give su¢ cient conditions that validate, for the highest
equilibrium, the conventional wisdom that social welfare and consumer surplus increase with more
competition, while industry prots decrease. Amir (2003) answers similar questions for standard
Cournot competition, thus facilitating the corresponding comparisons. As in network industries the
latter e¤ects might sometimes be reversed, we will also provide either su¢ cient conditions for these
reversals when appropriate or otherwise at least closed-form examples illustrating these possibilities.
We begin providing su¢ cient conditions for social welfare to increase with entry. Our initial
assumptions, A1-A5, are consistent with xn being increasing or decreasing in n, as reected in
Theorem 14. The next theorem shows that the implications of these two possibilities on social
welfare are quite di¤erent.
Theorem 18 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then, at the highest equilibrium, Wn+1 Wn if one of
the following conditions holds
(i)
Z Zn
0

P
 
t; Zn+1
  P  t; Zn dt  Zn [A (xn+1) A (xn)]; or
(ii) xn+1  xn:
Note that since P2 (Z; S) > 0, by A1, and Zn+1  Zn, by Theorem 13 (i), the left hand side of
Condition (i) is always positive. So our theorem identies the next two su¢ cient conditions: welfare
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increases in the number of rms in the presence of diseconomies of scale (A (:) is increasing) and
decreasing per-rm output, or whenever per-rm output increases in n.
The network e¤ects play a key role in these two conditions. As it is readily veried, they facilitate
the rst inequality by enlarging the left hand side of Condition (i). As seen earlier, they ease the
conditions under which per-rm output increases in n, therefore facilitating Condition (ii).
The next result states that if marginal costs are constant, then social welfare, at the highest
equilibrium, always increases with entry. Although this outcome follows as a direct implication
of Theorem 18 (i), we include it as a separate result because it reects the case most commonly
analyzed in the existing literature.
Corollary 19 In addition to A1-A5, assume the cost of production is linear, i.e. C (x) = cx with
c  0. Then, at the highest equilibrium, social welfare always increases in the number of rms.
We next study consumer surplus, for which our results di¤er markedly from their counterparts
in the standard Cournot oligopoly.
Theorem 20 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then, at the highest equilibrium, CSn+1  CSn if
either (i) P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  P  Zn; Zn; or (ii) P12 (Z; S)  0.
As a consequence of the so-called property of quasi-competitiveness, which under similar condi-
tions holds in the standard Cournot game, Condition (i) is always satised without network e¤ects.
Example 4, at the end of the section, shows the opposite sometimes happens in network industries.
Katz and Shapiro (1985) clearly explain why this surprising result might occur here: If the mar-
ginal consumer has a strong network externality, then the increment in the expected network size
generated by the larger number of rms in the market, will increase his/her willingness to pay for
the product above that of the average consumer. As a consequence, the rms will be able to raise
the price by more than the increase in the average consumers willingness to pay for the product
and consumers surplus will fall.
Our last theorem deals with industry prots. Like the previous two, it provides su¢ cient con-
ditions for aggregate prots to increase after new entry. It also gives su¢ cient conditions for the
opposite, more common, result.
Theorem 21 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Then, at the highest equilibrium,
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(i) (n+ 1)n+1  nn if P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
 P  Zn; Zn  A (xn+1) A (xn) and/or the conditions
of Theorem 16 (i) are satised; and
(ii) (n+ 1)n+1  nn if P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  P  Zn+1; Zn  A (xn+1) A  n+1n xn+1.
The proof of Theorem 21 (i) is quite simple. Relying on the fact that the highest selection of
the equilibrium industry output increases in n, the rst su¢ cient condition simply says that, if the
overall e¤ect on the market price is larger than the change of the average cost of production, then
industry prots increase. The second statement is a corollary of Theorem 16 (i). The justication
of Theorem 21 (ii) is quite similar to the previous one.
The nal result is a direct implication of the last one. It states that if rms have linear costs and
the network e¤ect on the market price dominates the output e¤ect after new entry, then aggregate
equilibrium prots increase with more competition.
Corollary 22 In addition to A1-A5, assume the cost of production is linear, i.e. C (x) = cx with
c  0. Then, at the highest equilibrium, industry prots increase in the number of rms if market
price increases after new entry.
Example 4 ends this section. It illustrates how consumer surplus and industry prots might
decrease and increase, respectively, after new entry.
Example 4. Consider the symmetric Cournot oligopoly with no production costs and inverse
demand function given by
P (Z; S) = maxfa  Z=S3; 0g with Z; S 2 [0; nK] and a;K > 1:
The reaction function of any given rm is
x (y; S) =
8<: max
 
aS3   y =2; 0	 if  aS3   y =2 < K
K if
 
aS3   y =2  K :
Thus, we have three possible FECE aggregate outputs
Zn =
n
0;
p
(n+ 1) =(na); nK
o
:
From a simple computation, consumer surplus is zero at the smallest equilibrium and, assuming a 
1= (nK)2 ; it equals the following expression at the highest one
CSn = 1= (2nK) :
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Since this expression is decreasing in n, consumer surplus decreases after new entry for the highest
equilibrium. This result is possible because Conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 20 are not satised,
i.e. the market price at the highest equilibrium increases in n and P12 (Z; S) = 3=S4 > 0 for all Z; S:
Note that the opposite is true for aggregate prots. The following expression shows that they
increase in n at the highest equilibrium
nn = nK
h
a  1= (nK)2
i
:
As Corollary 19 states, next expression shows that social welfare, at the highest equilibrium, in-
creases in n
Wn = anK   1= (2nK) :
These results point out some of the relevant di¤erences between Cournot competition with and
without network e¤ects in terms of industry performance. 
9 Proofs
This section provides the proofs for all the results of the paper, and also contains the statements
and proofs of some useful intermediate results not given in the body of the paper.
The proof of Lemma 1 calls for an intermediate result.
Lemma 23 Assume A1-A5 hold. Then e (Z; y; S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S) :
Proof of Lemma 23
To prove this result, rst note that 2 (Z; S) > 0 if and only if @2 logP (Z; S) =@Z@S > 0: We
show that this condition implies that e (Z; y; S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S), i.e.
that for any Z > Z 0 and S > S0;
e  Z; y; S0  e  Z 0; y; S0 =) e (Z; y; S) > e  Z 0; y; S : (13)
Since @2 logP (Z; S) =@Z@S > 0 we have logP (Z; S)  logP (Z 0; S) > logP (Z; S0)  logP (Z 0; S0),
or
P (Z; S)
P (Z 0; S)
>
P (Z; S0)
P (Z 0; S0)
: (14)
The left hand side of (13) can be rewritten as
(Z   y)P  Z; S0  C (Z   y)   Z 0   yP  Z 0; S0  C  Z 0   y : (15)
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Combining (14) and (15), we get
(Z   y)P (Z; S) P (Z
0; S0)
P (Z 0; S)
  C (Z   y) >  Z 0   yP  Z 0; S0  C  Z 0   y : (16)
Multiplying both sides of (16) by P (Z 0; S) =P (Z 0; S0) we obtain
(Z   y)P (Z; S)  P (Z
0; S)
P (Z 0; S0)
C (Z   y) >  Z 0   yP  Z 0; S  P (Z 0; S)
P (Z 0; S0)
C
 
Z 0   y : (17)
By A1, P (Z 0; S) =P (Z 0; S0) > 1 and, by A2, C (Z   y)  C (Z 0   y) : Thus, (17) implies
(Z   y)P (Z; S)  C (Z   y) >  Z 0   yP  Z 0; S  C  Z 0   y ; (18)
which is just the right hand side of (13). Hence, (13) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 1
Since @2e (Z; y; S) =@Z@y = 1(Z; y) > 0, by A4, the maximand in (2) has strictly increasing
di¤erences in (Z; y). Furthermore, the feasible correspondence (y; S)  ! [y; y +K] is ascending
in y: Then, by Topkiss theorem [Theorem A.1, Appendix], every selection from the argmax ofe (Z; y; S), eZ (y; S), increases in y:
By Lemma 23, e (Z; y; S) has the strict single-crossing property in (Z;S). In addition, the
feasible correspondence (y; S)  ! [y; y +K] does not depend on S. Then, by [Theorem A.2,
Appendix] due to Milgrom and Shannon (1994), every selection from the argmax of e (Z; y; S),eZ (y; S), is also increasing in S: 
Proof of Theorem 2
The following mapping, which can be thought of as a normalized cumulative best-response, is
the key element in dealing with symmetric equilibria for any n25
Bn : [0; (n  1)K] [0; nK]  ! 2[0;(n 1)K][0;nK]
(y; S)  !

n  1
n
 
x0 + y

; x0 + y

where x0 denotes a best-response output level by a rm to a joint output y by the other (n 1) rms,
given S. It is readily veried that the (set-valued) range of Bn is as given, i.e. if x0 2 [0;K] and
y 2 [0; (n  1)K], then ((n  1)=n)(x0 + y) 2 [0; (n  1)K] and x0 + y 2 [0; nK] : Also, a xed point
25See Amir and Lambson (2000) and Kwon (2007).
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of Bn is easily seen as a symmetric equilibrium, for it must satisfy both by = ((n  1) =n) (bx0 + by) ;
or bx0 = by= (n  1) ; and bS = bx0 + by; which says that the responding rm produces as much as each
of the other (n  1) rms and the expected size of the network is fullled at equilibrium.
By Lemma 1 we know that every selection of eZ (y; S) increases in y and S: Hence, for any
xed n 2 N , every selection of Bn increases in (y; S), so that by Tarskis xed point theorem
[Theorem A.3, Appendix], it has a xed point. As argued before, a xed point of Bn is a symmetric
equilibrium. This proves the rst statement of Theorem 2. We next show that no asymmetric
equilibria exists.
To this end, it su¢ ces to show that the correspondence eZ (y; S) is strictly increasing (in the
sense that all its selections are strictly increasing) in y, for each S. Thus, for all possible S, to each
Z 0 2 eZ (y; S) corresponds (at most) one y such that Z 0 = x0 + y with Z 0 being a best-response to
y and S. In other words, for each equilibrium output Z 0, each rm must be producing the same
x0 = Z 0   y, with y = (n  1)x0.
A4 implies that @e (Z; y; S) =@Z is strictly increasing in y, a property slightly stronger than
strictly increasing di¤erences in (Z; y): By Topkis (1998), Theorem 2.8.5 on p. 79, this property
implies that eZ (y; S) is strictly increasing in y for each S, whenever eZ (y; S) is interior.26 The
second statement in Theorem 2 follows because, as argued in the previous paragraph, this condition
guarantees no asymmetric equilibria exist. 
The next proof, from Amir and Lambson (2000), is included for completeness only.
Proof of Lemma 3
To show Part (i) consider the mapping
Tn : [0; (n  1)K]  ! 2[0;(n 1)K]
y  !

n  1
n
 
x0 + y

: (19)
The proof of existence and the fact that no asymmetric equilibrium exists follow as a simply corollary
of the proof of Theorem 2, thus we omit it.
We next show that if A5 is also satised, the extremal selections of zn (S), zn (S) and zn (S),
increase in S. We know, by Topkiss theorem, that the maximal and minimal selections of Tn
denoted, respectively, Tn and Tn; exist. Furthermore, the largest value of zn (S), zn (S), constitutes
26This result was proved in Amir (1996) and Edlin and Shannon (1998).
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the largest xed point of Tn. Under A5 we know, by Lemma 1, that every selection of eZ (y; S)
increases in S. Then the largest xed point of Tn, zn (S) ; is also increasing in S [Theorem A.4,
Appendix]. A similar argument, using the selection Tn, establishes that zn (S) is increasing in S.
This ends the proof of Part (ii).
To prove Part (iii), we show that adding A6 leads to zn (:) being a single-valued and continuous
function. From Amir (1996a), Theorem 2.1, we know that the best-response correspondence ex (y; S),
as dened in (1), is nonincreasing given that P (Z; S) is log-concave in Z. In addition, since every
selection of eZ (y; S) increases in y (Lemma 1) and eZ (y; S) = ex (y; S) + y, it follows that every
selection of ex (y; S) has all its slopes bounded below by  1. Altogether then, all the slopes of every
selection of ex (y; S) lie in [ 1; 0]. This leads to the uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium through a
well-known argument, a proof of which is given in Amir and Lambson (2000), Theorem 2.3. Hence,
zn (:) is single-valued. Since zn (:) is also u.h.c. as a correspondence, due to rmspayo¤s being
continuous in S, the conclusion follows. 
Proof of Lemma 4
By denition, an industry output of 0 is a FECE if 0 2 ex (0; 0). This holds if and only if we
have
 (0; 0; 0)   (x; 0; 0)
0  xP (x; 0)  C (x)
C (x)  xP (x; 0)
for all x 2 [0;K] : This proves our rst statement. The second one follows because all the steps are
independent of the number of rms in the market. 
The proof of Theorem 5 calls for several intermediate results, which will turn out to be useful for
some other proofs as well. We rst state su¢ cient conditions under which an increasing selection
of zn (S) is di¤erentiable for almost all S, and give a specic functional form for its slope. We then
show that when 0 is part of the equilibrium set, then zn (0) is single-valued and right-continuous.
Lemma 24 Assume A1-A5 are satised. Let bzn be an increasing selection of zn (S), such thatbzn (S) 2 (0; nK). Then bzn (S) is di¤erentiable for almost all S; and its slope is given by
@bzn (S)
@S
=
 n fP1(bzn; S)P2(bzn; S)  [P (bzn; S)  C 0 (bzn=n)]P12(bzn; S)g
(n+ 1) [P1(bzn; S)]2   n [P (bzn; S)  C 0 (bzn=n)]P11(bzn; S)  P1(bzn; S)C 00 (bzn=n) (20)
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where bzn stands for bzn (S) :
Proof of Lemma 24
If bzn (S) is interior, it must satisfy the rst order condition
P (bzn; S) + (bzn=n)P1(bzn; S)  C 0 (bzn=n) = 0 (21)
where bzn stands for bzn (S). Multiplying both sides of (21) by n
nP (bzn; S) + znP1(bzn; S)  nC 0 (bzn=n) = 0: (22)
Since bzn (S) is increasing, it is di¤erentiable almost everywhere (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure) and
@bzn (S)
@S
=
  [nP2(bzn; S) + eznP12(bzn; S)]
(n+ 1)P1(bzn; S) + bznP11(bzn; S)  C 00 (bzn=n) : (23)
Substituting bzn (S) by its implicit value in (21), and multiplying the numerator and the denominator
by P1(zn; S), we obtain (20). 
Proof of Lemma 6
We rst show that if 0 2 zn (0), then 0 = zn (0), i.e., zn (0) is a singleton. By Lemma 4 we know
that 0 2 zn (0) if and only if
xP (x; 0)  C (x) for all x 2 [0;K] : (24)
Since P1 (Z; S) < 0 by A1, it follows from (24) that xP (x+ y; 0) < C (x) for all x 2 (0;K] and all
y > 0: Hence, 0 is a dominant strategy in the standard Cournot game given S = 0. This proves
that zn (0) is single-valued.
The fact that P (0; 0) = C 0(0) ensures the trivial outcome is an interior equilibrium. To show
(4), take any sequence Sk # 0 such that bzn is di¤erentiable at Sk for all k (this is possible since the
set of points of di¤erentiability of an increasing function forms a dense subset of its domain). Sincebzn is increasing, it has left and right limits at every point, so the limit limk!1 bzn(Sk) exists. Since
zn(:) is u.h.c. (see the proof of Lemma 3), limk!1 bzn(Sk) 2 zn (0) = f0g, so that by the earlier part
of this proof, limk!1 bzn(Sk) = 0.
Now consider (23) with S = Sk. By Assumption A1 and the fact that limk!1 bzn(Sk) = 0, the
right-hand side of (23) is right-continuous in S at 0. Taking limits as k  ! 1, (4) follows. Since
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this argument is clearly independent of the particular (increasing) selection bzn and of the sequence
(Sk) chosen, @zn (S) =@SjS=0 is single-valued, continuous at 0, and given by (4).
The fact that z0n (0) = 0 if the trivial equilibrium in not interior follows directly from our previous
arguments, thus we omit this proof. 
We next show that, for all S 2 [0; nK], any argmax of a ctitious objective function (Z; S)
is an element of zn (S) : Note that, given S, (Z; S) may be viewed as a weighted combination of
industry prots and welfare, with respective weights 1n and
n 1
n , as constructed by Bergstrom and
Varian (1985) for standard Cournot.
Lemma 25 Assume A1-A5 are satised and C (:) is convex. Dene
(Z; S) , n  1
n
Z Z
0
P (t; S) dt+
Z
n
P (Z; S)  nC (Z=n) :
Given any n 2 N and S 2 [0; nK], if Z 0 2 argmax f(Z; S) : 0  Z  nKg then Z 0 2 zn (S) :
Proof of Lemma 25
Assume Z is an argmax of (Z; S), we need to show Z corresponds to the industry output
of a symmetric Cournot equilibrium with exogenous S. Let Z = x + y, with x = Z=n and
y = (n  1)x, and consider Z 0 = x0 + y, with x0 2 [0;K] : Then x0 denotes a possible deviation
of a given rm from its equilibrium output x: We next show this unilateral deviation is never
protable.
Since Z is a maximizer of (Z; S) ; then (Z; S)  (Z 0; S), which is equivalent to say
n  1
n
Z x+y
0
P (t; S) dt+ xP (x + y; S)  nC (x) 
(n  1)
n
Z x0+y
0
P (t; S) dt+
(x0 + y)
n
P
 
x0 + y; S
  nC x0 + y
n

(25)
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Then we have
xP (x + y; S)  C (x)
 n  1
n
Z x0+y
0
P (t; S) dt+
(x0 + y)
n
P
 
x0 + y; S
  nC x0 + y
n

 n  1
n
Z x+y
0
P (t; S) dt+ (n  1)C (x)
 n  1
n
Z x0+y
x+y
P (t; S) dt+
(x0 + y)
n
P
 
x0 + y; S
  C  x0
 (n  1) (x
0   x)
n
P
 
x0 + y; S

+
(x0 + y)
n
P
 
x0 + y; S
  C  x0
= x0P
 
x0 + y; S
  C  x0 :
The rst inequality follows from (25), after rearranging terms. The second one holds as we assumed
C (:) is convex (and y = (n  1)x), and the last one by A1, P1 (Z; S) < 0: Since x0 is arbitrary,
this argument shows that x is a symmetric Cournot equilibrium. 
Proof of Theorem 5
Part (i) holds because, if the trivial outcome (zero output) is not part of the equilibrium set,
Theorem 2 guarantees there is a FECE with strictly positive industry output.
Parts (ii) and (iii) are both based on the following argument. By Lemma 3, the maximal and
minimal selections of zn (S), zn (S) and zn (S), increase in S. Assume, for the moment, there exists
an S0 2 (0; nK] such that zn (S0)  S0: If we restrict attention to the values of S in [S0; nK],
it follows that zn (S) 2 [S0; nK] because zn (:) is increasing and zn (S0)  S0: Therefore, for all
S 2 [S0; nK], zn (S) is an increasing function that maps [S0; nK] into itself. Hence, by Tarskis xed
point theorem [Theorem A.3, Appendix], there is an S0  S00  nK such that zn (S00) = S00: Since
this condition implies zn (S00) is a strictly positive FECE, the existence of a nontrivial equilibrium
reduces to showing there is at least one S 2 (0; nK] for which an element of zn (S) is above S, i.e.
zn (S)  S:
To prove Part (ii), we show z0n (0) > 1. Using Lemma 6, z0n (0) > 1 if, given P1 (0; 0)+P2 (0; 0) >
0,
n >
 P1 (0; 0) + C 00 (0) = [P1 (0; 0) + P2 (0; 0)] :
Then the existence of a nontrivial FECE follows by the argument in the previous paragraph, as
Lemma 6 and the property z0n (0) > 1; imply there exists a small " > 0 for which zn (") > ": This
completes the proof of Part (ii).
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Condition (3) in Part (iii) is equivalent to say there is some S 2 (0; nK] and some bZ  S for
which n
h

 bZ; S (Z; S)i  0 for all Z  S: As a consequence, the largest argmax of (Z; S)
must be larger than S. Call this argmax Z 0. Our proof follows because Z 0 2 zn (S), by Lemma 25,
and this ensures there is an S 2 (0; nK] for which an element of zn (S) is higher than S: 
Proof of Theorem 7
Under A1-A6 we know, by Lemma 3, that zn (:) is a single-valued, continuous and increasing
function. The fact that f (Z; n) is equal to its slope along the diagonal, follows from a stronger
version of Lemma 24 as follows. Consider (21) with zn (S) instead of bzn (S). By the implicit
function theorem, @zn (S) =@S exists at every S and is given by (20) with bzn (S) replaced by zn (S).
Evaluating this along the diagonal Z = S, we see that it is equal to f (Z; n).
The uniqueness result now follows directly from the assumption f (Z; n) < 1 for all Z; since any
two adjacent xed points of zn (S) must include one for which f (Z; n)  1. 
Proof of Proposition 10
By Lemma 3, zn (:) and zn (:) are increasing.
To prove Part (i), rst assume 0 is not an equilibrium. Then zn (0) > 0 and the orbit in (7) withbzn = zn and S0 = 0 (or S0 near 0) must converge to the smallest xed point of zn (:), which is a
strictly positive equilibrium by (the successive approximation part of) Tarskis xed point theorem.
Hence orbits with higher values of S0 will converge to non-zero xed points of zn (:) :
Next, assume Condition (ii) of Theorem 5 holds. Then we know that zn (S) > S for S small
enough (cf. Lemma 6). So any orbit with S0 near 0 converges to the smallest xed point of zn (:)
with strictly positive output, and orbits with higher values of S0 are as in the previous step.
To prove Part (ii), Condition (iii) of Theorem 5 ensures there is an S0 2 (0; nK] for which
zn (S0)  S0. By Tarskis Theorem applied to zn mapping [S0,nK] to itself, the orbit starting at
S0 must converge to a strictly positive equilibrium.
To prove Part (iii), note that since 0 is a FECE, there can be no other FECE by Theorem 7.
Hence, every orbit from any S0 is a decreasing sequence to 0. 
Proof of Theorem 12
We will show Part (i) for a change in n, the proof for  is almost identical so we omit it. To this
end, we use the mapping (19) in the proof of Lemma 3. We know, by Topkiss theorem, that the
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maximal and minimal selections of Tn, Tn and Tn, exist. Furthermore, the largest value of zn (S),
zn (S), constitutes the largest xed point of Tn. Since (n  1) =n increases in n every selection of
Tn is increasing. Then the largest xed point of Tn, zn (S) ; is also increasing in n [Theorem A.4,
Appendix]. A similar argument, using the selection Tn, establishes that zn (S) is increasing in n.
The second statement of Part (i) follows directly from Denition 11 and the fact that zn (S)
and zn (S) shift up as n increases.
To prove Part (ii), observe that if the trivial equilibrium holds and P1 (0; 0)+P2 (0; 0)  0, then,
by Lemma 6, z0n (0) < 1 8 n, so that 0 is a stable equilibrium 8 n. This ends our proof. 
Proof of Theorem 13
The maximal and minimal selections of Bn (as dened in the proof of Theorem 2) denoted,
respectively, Bn and Bn; exist by Topkiss theorem. Furthermore, the largest equilibrium values of
yn and Zn ,
 
yn; Zn

, constitute the largest xed point of Bn. Since (n  1) =n is increasing in n,
Bn is increasing in n for all (y; S). Since Bn is also increasing in both y and S, the largest xed
point of Bn;
 
yn; Zn

; is also increasing in n (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990). A similar argument,
using the selection Bn; establishes that

y
n
; Zn

increases in n as well. This shows part (i).
Part (ii) follows directly from Part (i) since dP (Z;Z) =dz = P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) : 
Proof of Theorem 14
Consider the following mapping
Mn : [0; nK]  ! 2[0;K]
Z  ! ex = x : P (Z;Z) + xP1 (Z;Z)  C 0 (x) = 0	 : (26)
ThenMn maps industry output into the solution of a ctitious rst order condition, which coincides
with that of an interior FECE when x = Z=n and Z = Zn:
Totally di¤erentiating this rst order condition with respect to n; we have
fP1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z) + ex [P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z)]g dz
dn
= 0: (27)
Substituting in (27) ex by [C 0 (Z=n)  P (Z;Z)] =P1 (Z;Z) ; and rearranging terms, we get
  1
P1 (Z;Z)

P (Z;Z)  C 0 (Z=n) [P11 (Z;Z) + P12 (Z;Z)]  P1 (Z;Z) [P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)]	 dz
dn
= 0:
(28)
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Substituting g (Z) from (10) into (28), we get
  1
P1 (Z;Z)
g (Z)
dz
dn
= 0: (29)
By A1, P1 (Z;Z) < 0. Also, by Theorem 13 (i), the extremal equilibrium industry outputs increase
in n: Then, if g (Z)  () 0 over Zn; Zn+1, the mapping Mn increases (decreases) in n at the
largest equilibrium industry output. Theorem 14 follows because if Mn increases (decreases) in n
at the largest equilibrium industry output, then xn also increases (decreases) with this parameter.
By a similar argument it can be shown that this is also true for xn. 
Proof of Corollary 15
Inequality 11 equals function g (Z) when the rms face no cost of production. Then the rst
claim follows directly from Theorem 14 (i).
The rst term in the left hand side of (11) is always positive by A5. As the log-convexity
of P (Z; S) in Z guarantees the second term is also positive, this is a su¢ cient condition for the
required inequality. 
Proof of Theorem 16
Consider the following inequalities
n+1 = xn+1P
 
xn+1 + yn+1; Zn+1
  C (xn+1)
 xnP
 
xn + yn+1; Zn+1
  C (xn)
 xnP
 
xn+1 + yn+1; Zn+1
  C (xn)
 xnP
 
xn + yn; Zn
  C (xn)
= n:
The rst inequality follows by the Cournot equilibrium property. The second one is from xn+1  xn
and A1. (The fact that xn+1  xn here follows by Theorem 14 (i) because we assumed all its
required conditions are satised.) The third inequality follows because our assumptions imply
P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  P  Zn; Zn : Therefore, n+1  n: By a similar argument it can be shown that
this is also true for the equilibrium per-rm prots evaluated at the minimal equilibrium outputs.
This shows Part (i).
We omit the proof of Part (ii) as it is almost identical to the previous one. 
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Proof of Corollary 17
If P11 (Z;Z)+P12 (Z;Z) = 0, then g (Z) =  P1 (Z;Z) [P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z)] : By A1, P1 (Z;Z) <
0. Then the sign of g (Z) is equal to the sign of P1 (Z;Z) + P2 (Z;Z), and Corollary 17 (i) and (ii)
follow by Theorems 14 (i) and 16 (i), respectively. 
Proof of Theorem 18
To show Part (i) consider
Wn+1  Wn =
Z Zn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt  Zn+1A (xn+1) 
"Z Zn
0
P
 
t; Zn

dt  ZnA (xn)
#

Z Zn
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt  ZnA (xn+1) 
"Z Zn
0
P
 
t; Zn

dt  ZnA (xn)
#
 0:
The rst inequality follows because P
 
t; Zn+1
 A (xn+1)  0 for all t  Zn+1, and Zn+1  Zn by
Theorem 13 (i). The second inequality holds by the assumed conditions.
To show Part (ii) let us dene Vn (x; S) =
R nx
0 P (t; S) dt nC (x) : Notice Vn (x; S) is concave in
x since n [nP1 (nx; S)  C 00 (x)] < 0 by both A1 and A4. In addition,Z Zn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt =
Z nxn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt+
Z Zn+1
nxn+1
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt

Z nxn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt+ xn+1P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1

(30)
where the inequality follows by A1. The following steps show our result
Wn+1  Wn =
Z (n+1)xn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt  (n+ 1)C (xn+1) 
Z nxn
0
P
 
t; Zn

dt  nC (xn)

 n+1 +
Z nxn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt  nC (xn+1) 
Z nxn
0
P
 
t; Zn

dt  nC (xn)

 n+1 +
Z nxn+1
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt  nC (xn+1) 
Z nxn
0
P
 
t; Zn+1

dt  nC (xn)

= n+1 + Vn
 
xn+1; Zn+1
  Vn  xn; Zn+1
 n+1 +

@Vn
 
xn+1; Zn+1

=@x

(xn+1   xn)
= n+1 + n

P
 
nxn+1; Zn+1
  C 0 (xn+1) (xn+1   xn)
 n+1 + n

P
 
(n+ 1)xn+1; Zn+1
  C 0 (xn+1) (xn+1   xn)
 0:
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The rst inequality follows from inequality (30), the second one by A1 and Theorem 13 (i) and
the third one by the concavity of Vn (x; S) in x: The fourth inequality holds by A1 and because we
assumed xn+1  xn, and the last one by the Cournot property. This completes our proof. 
Proof of Corollary 19
If the cost of production is linear, the right hand side of the required condition in Theorem 18
(i) is zero. Its left hand side is always positive because Zn+1  Zn and, by A1, P2 (Z; S) > 0. Our
result follows because these two facts ensure Theorem 18 (i) is satised. 
Proof of Theorem 20
The proof of Part (i) follows directly from Theorem 13 (i).
The following steps prove Part (ii)
CSn+1   CSn =
Z Zn+1
0

P
 
t; Zn+1
  P  Zn+1; Zn+1 dt  Z Zn
0

P
 
t; Zn
  P  Zn; Zn dt

Z Zn
0

P
 
t; Zn+1
  P  Zn+1; Zn+1 dt  Z Zn
0

P
 
t; Zn
  P  Zn; Zn dt
= Zn

P
 
Zn; Zn
  P  Zn+1; Zn
 
Z Zn
0

P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  P  Zn+1; Zn  P  t; Zn+1  P  t; Zn	 dt
 Zn

P
 
Zn; Zn
  P  Zn+1; Zn
 0:
The rst inequality follows directly from P1 (Z; S) < 0 and Theorem 13 (i). The next step is
obtained from the previous one by adding and subtracting
R Zn
0 P
 
Zn+1; Zn

dt; and rearranging
terms: To justify the second inequality notice that P12 (Z; S)  0 is su¢ cient forZ Zn
0

P
 
t; Zn+1
  P  t; Zn dt  Z Zn
0

P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  P  Zn+1; Zn dt:
Our last step is true since P1 (Z; S) < 0.
Hence, P12 (Z; S)  0 8 Z; S 2 [0; nK] is su¢ cient for CSn+1   CSn  0; or CSn+1  CSn: 
Proof of Theorem 21
We next show the rst statement in Part (i) For an extremal equilibrium industry output,
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consider
(n+ 1)n+1   nn = Zn+1

P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
 A (xn+1)  Zn P  Zn; Zn A (xn)
 Zn

P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
 A (xn+1)  Zn P  Zn; Zn A (xn)
= Zn

[P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
  P  Zn; Zn]  [A (xn+1) A (xn)]	 :
Since P
 
Zn+1; Zn+1
   A (xn+1)  0, the inequality follows by Theorem 13 (i). The rst part of
Theorem 21 simply says that if the last function is positive, then (n+ 1)n+1  nn: The second
statement in Part (i) follows directly from Theorem (16) (i).
The proof of Part (ii) is similar to the previous one so we omit it. 
Proof of Corollary 22
This result follows directly from our rst statement in Theorem 21 (i), because linear costs imply
constant average costs of production. 
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APPENDIX
In an attempt to make this paper self-contained, we provide a summary of all lattice-theoretic
notions and results used here. Since this paper deals with real decision and parameter spaces, every
theorem that follows is a special case of the original one (see Topkis, 1998).
A function F : R2+ ! R is supermodular if, for x1  x2; y1  y2,
F (x1; y1) F (x2; y1) F (x1; y2) F (x2; y2) : (31)
If F is twice continuously di¤erentiable, Topkiss (1978) Characterization Theorem says that su-
permodularity is equivalent to
@2F
@x@y
 0; for all x, y. Furthermore, @
2F
@x@y
> 0 implies that F is
strictly supermodular, the latter notion being dened by a strictly inequality in (31).
F has the single-crossing property or SCP in (x; y) if, for x1  x2; y1  y2,
F (x1; y2) F (x2; y2) 0 =) F (x1; y1) F (x2; y1) 0 (32)
Note that (31) implies (32), while the converse is generally not true. Additionally, (31) is a cardinal
notion while (32) is ordinal. Thus, the SCP is sometimes also referred to as ordinal supermodularity.
For x 2 R+, let A (x) = [a1 (x) ; a2 (x)]  R+, with a1 (:) and a2 (:) being real-valued functions.
We say A (:) is ascending (in x) if a1 and a2 are increasing in x: The following results on monotone
maximizers are central to our approach.
Theorem A.1. (Topkis, 1978). Assume that (i) F is upper-semi continuous (or u.s.c.) and
supermodular in (x; y) and (ii) A (:) is ascending. Then, the maximal and minimal selections of
y (x)  argmaxy2A(x) F (x; y) are increasing functions. Furthermore, if F is strictly supermodular,
then every selection of y (:) is increasing.
Theorem A.2. (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994). Assume that (i) F is u.s.c. and has the SCP in
(x; y) and (ii) A (:) is ascending. Then, the conclusion of Theorem A.1. holds.
Theorem A.3. Let n  1 and B : Xni=1[ai; bi] ! Xni=1[ai; bi] be an increasing function. Then
B has a xed point. (This theorem is a special case of Tarskis Fixed Point Theorem.)
Our equilibrium comparisons are based on the following result (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990).
Theorem A.4. Let Bt : Xni=1[ai; bi] ! Xni=1[ai; bi] be an increasing function, 8t, such that
Bt (x) is also increasing in t, 8x. Then the minimal and maximal xed-points of Bt are increasing
in t.
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